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This paper tests the hypothesis that portfolio diversification can increase the threat of systemic 
financial risk. The paper provides first a theoretical rationale for the possibility that systemic 
risk may be increased by the proliferation of financial instruments that lead operators to hold 
increasingly similar portfolios. Secondly, the paper tests the hypothesis that diversification may 
result in increasing systematic risk, by analyzing the portfolio dynamics of some of the major 
world open funds.  
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Introduction  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the link between portfolio diversification 
and its implications on the question of systemic risk. We first show that the introduction of any 
contingent claim, whose value is correlated with the value of the assets owned by a population of 
heterogeneous agents, causes an improvement of the agents‟ expected utility. At the same time, 
such an introduction will increase overall systemic risk. These effects are due to the cumulative 
interaction of two distinct, but closely related factors:  
(i) The gain obtained from diversifying one‟s portfolio, thus reducing risk exposure 
through risk sharing;  
(ii) The gain obtained through risk shifting from higher to lower risk-aversion agents. 
We test the hypothesis on the negative relationship between diversification and systemic risk 
by estimating a simultaneous equation model on a panel of the 266 largest mutual funds (based on 
size). In particular, we use 162 funds to analyze the US market and 64 funds for the European area, 
exchanged in the market between January 2003 and March 2010. The plan of the paper is as 
follows. In section 1, we review the basic concepts and some of the recent literature on systemic 
risk. In section 2, we look in particular at the relationship between diversification and systemic risk. 
In Section 3, we develop a theoretical model that captures the essence of this relationship, by 
analyzing the effects on both diversification and systemic risks of the issuance of an additional 
security. In section 4 we describe the data set. In Section 5 we present the econometric analysis and 
the results obtained. In the last section we discuss some conclusive remarks.  
1. On the Meaning and the Measure of Systemic Risk  
In the context of analysis of financial instability, an active debate has emerged around how to 
define both a systemic event, a systemic risk, and their effects.  Despite the considerable amount of 
literature on the topic, no shared consensus exists about the meaning, features and policy 
implications of these concepts. Highlighting the complexity of these issues, Alan Greenspan (1995), 
as chair of the Federal Reserve System (FED), has underlined that “the very definition of systemic 
risk is somewhat unsettled”.  
Macro-level analyses of systemic risk can be found in several works of the past two decades. 
Kaufman et al. (2003) refer to systemic risk as the risk or the probability of collapse in an entire 
financial system. Bartholomew et al. (1995) examine, within the systemic risk spreading 
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mechanism, its effect not only on the domestic economy, but also on the entire international 
banking, financial, or economic system. Mishkin (1995) focuses on the investment repercussions of 
such an important event. Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the cause-effect process through which 
macro-shocks can spark contagion episodes and bank runs. Bordo et al. (1998) define systemic risk 
as a situation where “shocks to one part of the financial system lead to shocks elsewhere, in turn 
impinging on the stability of the real economy” (pp. 31). In their exhaustive review of the literature, 
De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) offer a similar view of a systemic event, saying that it takes place 
when a shock affects “a considerable number of financial institutions or markets in a strong sense” 
(p.11). De Nicolò and Kwast (2002), and Dow (2000), define systemic risk as a mechanism that, at 
the same time of the shock, affects the entire financial system, while Lehar (2005) says that “a 
systemic crisis can be defined as an event in which a considerable number of financial institutions 
default simultaneously”. 
The search of the micro foundations of systemic risk across shock-transmissions and 
spillover effects on the entire financial system has given rise to a different strand of literature. The 
following contributions emphasize causation mechanisms requiring close and direct connections 
among several institutions and different markets. Kaufman (1995) underlines the fact that systemic 
risk is the probability that cumulative losses originate from an event that, through a contagion 
effect, involves a chain of institutions belonging to a market. The Board of Governors of the FED 
(2001) provides a definition whereby systemic risk jeopardizes the solvency capacity of 
institutions
2
. Kambhu et al. (2007) define systemic risk as a situation where financial shocks “have 
the potential to lead to substantial, adverse effects on the real economy, e.g., a reduction in 
productive investment due to the reduction in credit provision or a destabilization of economic 
activity”. This contribution has stressed the transmission of financial events to the real economy, as  
the key feature distinguishing a systemic event from a purely financial event. The contagion effect 
indiscriminately affects more or less the entire universe reflecting a general loss of confidence in all 
the units (solvent and insolvent) involved in the system. Referring not only to bankruptcy but also 
to the default of all market participants, the G-10 “Report on Financial Consolidation” (2001) 
defines systemic risk as: “…a risk that an event will trigger a loss of confidence in a substantial 
portion of the financial system that is serious enough to have adverse consequences for the real 
economy”. In Bartram et al. (2005), systemic risk affects the unexposed institutions not otherwise 
involved by a crisis given its economic fundamentals.  
                                                          
2
 “Private large-dollar payments network were unable or unwilling to settle its net debt position. (…) Serious 
repercussions could, as a result, spread to other participants in the private network, to other depository institutions not 
participating in the network, and to the nonfinancial economy generally”. 
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Overall, we can conclude that despite the vast literature on systemic risk, a clear and shared 
view of the concepts underlying this term has not emerged.  Nevertheless, in the attempt to provide 
a general and unambiguous definition of systemic risk, both at a macro and micro level, three 
principal aspects  must be recognized:  
1.  Impact on a “substantial portion” of the financial system; 
2.  Spillovers  from one institution to many others; 
3.  Strong and adverse macroeconomic effects.  
Turning  again to the literature, we have carried out a review of systemic risk measures, 
according to two broad categories of indicators:  
a) Traditional macroeconomic indicators of financial soundness and stability;  
b) Indicators of interdependencies among financial institutions through the analysis of the 
financial institution‟s assets.  
The first group of measures relies on bank capital ratios and bank liabilities to show that 
aggregate macroeconomic indicators can provide a valid and useful instrument to predict systemic 
financial threats. Through the study of macroeconomic fundamentals, Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. 
(1997), Gorton (1998) and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999)  demonstrate how macro analysis can be 
appropriately used to estimate systemic risk. More recently, Bhansali et al. (2008) derive a 
“systemic credit risk” variable from  aggregate index credit derivatives, finding that this measure of 
systemic risk  roughly doubles during the 2007-2009 financial crisis as compared to May 2005. De 
Nicolò and Lucchetta (2009) use a dynamic factor model to work out joint forecasts of indicators of 
systemic real risk and systemic financial risk, and then elaborate stress-tests of these indicators as 
impulse responses to structurally identifiable shocks.  
The second group of measures quantifies  the linkages among financial institutions as well 
as  exposures among banks that through their business can influence each other in situations of 
financial distress. A more recent contribution is given by Lehar (2005), assessing the probability 
that a certain number of banks within a specific arc of time go bankrupt due  to reduced asset value 
vis a vis a critical and well-defined liability value. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) define CoVaR 
as the VaR of financial institutions conditional on other institutions that experience, at the same 
time, financial distress. De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2009) investigate the transmission channels and 
contagion effects of certain shocks between the macroeconomy, the financial markets and the 
intermediaries. Huang et al. (2010) use as a proxy of systemic risk, the price of insuring a dozen of 
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the major U.S banks against financial turmoil on the basis of both ex-ante bank default probabilities 
and forecasted asset-returns correlations.  
The IMF (2009) surveys four different methods to assess interlinkages among financial 
institutions:  
 The network approach, where the interbank market spreads the transmission of financial 
stress through the banking system (Allen et al. (2010));   
 The co-risk model, (or co-movement risk model) whereby the probability default of one 
institution is directly linked to the default risk of another institution (Adrian et al. (2009, 
p.5)), de Vries et al. (2001), Longin and Solnik (2001) and Chan-Lau (2004); 
 The distress dependence matrix based on the probability of default of banks‟ pairs, taking 
into account a panel of financial institutions Goodhart and Segoviano (2009); 
  The default intensity model based on the estimate of the probability of default of financial 
institutions Giesecke and Bacho (2009)).   
Among other contributions that are worth mentioning, Bartram et al. (2005) propose three 
different approaches to estimate systemic risk by observing market reaction to global financial 
shocks for a subset of banks that are not directly exposed to the shock
3
. Capuano (2008) develops a 
framework to derive a market-based measure of probability of default, defined as the probability 
that the value of the underlying asset will fall below a given threshold. Using a VaR approach, 
Acharya et al. (2010), define systemic risk as the likelihood of experiencing cumulative losses in 
financial system that exceed the predicted by VaR model.  
2. Systemic Risk and Portfolio Diversification  
 Recalling the 2008 financial crises, characterized by a conglomerate of interrelated financial 
services and multi-sector institutions, a vibrant discussion has emerged regarding the causes of the 
recent financial system collapse. In this debate, many financial actors have been analyzing the roots 
of this phenomenon: on one side, many address as micro-drivers of this turmoil the financialization 
of the real economy (e.g. mortgage-backed securities (MBS)); others, on the other side, highlight as 
macro-drivers the lack of an efficient macro-prudential banking system (e.g. timely mechanisms 
able to prevent contagion and spread). In this current framework, Rodrìgez-Moreno et al. (2010) 
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 Bertrand et al. (2005) argue that in efficient capital markets, negative information (as 9/11) will affect bank 
performances that are exposed to the events in question. Unexposed banks will be unaffected by these effects.   
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argue that academic research has widely investigated both idiosyncratic and systematic risk, 
ignoring the fundamental importance of systemic risk and its implications on the financial markets. 
This concept is also clearly expressed in Masera et al. (2010), stating “it is now clear that 
supervisory authorities, policy makers and political authorities must look, beyond idiosyncratic 
risk, also at the systemic risk to the broader financial system that certain very large financial firms 
(Systemically Important Financial Institutions – SIFIs) pose”.  
 Further, what appears to have been less investigated in the relevant literature are the potential 
effects of portfolio diversification on systemic risk. While the benefits of diversification at a 
microeconomic level (in portfolio choices theory) have been thoroughly examined in the economic 
literature (Allan and Gale, 2005; Freixas et al., 2005; and Wagner and Marsh, 2006), the 
macroeconomic side of the link between diversification and systemic risk remains complex, multi-
faceted, and not yet completely explored (Lo, 2008). In this regard, two different views, outlining 
both the negative and positive effects of the relationship between diversification and systemic risk, 
have been characterizing this more controversial strand of the literature. Although portfolio 
diversification reduces risks at each individual institution, from the prospective of the entire 
financial system, it only reallocates these individual risks (Wagner, 2009). As argued in de Vries 
(2005) “…while diversification reduces the frequency of individual bank failures, since smaller 
shocks can be easily borne by the system, at the same time diversification makes the bank sector 
prone to systemic breakdowns in case of very large (non-macro) shocks, which otherwise would 
only have isolated impact”. Indeed, there is not any evidence to date, which would indicate that 
portfolio diversification reduces the threat of systemic risk. Further diversification leads to sharing 
risks across institutions involved in contributing to make these positions similar to each other, with 
the effect of facilitating financial contagion due to interlinked relationships among financial 
institutions. Nevertheless, it is crucial to include in these causes even the large financial 
conglomerates and the increasing presence of derivative instruments in the international financial 
system. In particular, derivative products have been indicated as both a responsible mechanism and 
perverse interaction of risk spreading and transferring from the banking to the insurance sector and 
vice versa (e.g. Originate-to-Distribute Model in banking and OTC derivatives).  
 In this regard, risk transfers between insurers and the banking sector represent a widely used 
diversification instrument, allowing banks to transform liquid liabilities of depositors into illiquid 
assets (loans) (de Vries 2010). Furthermore, and in particular during the last decade, there are many 
contributions sustaining the contention that diversification has negative effects on the financial 
system, including De Young and Roland (2001), Stiroh  (2004, 2006), Acharya et al. (2006), and 
Hirtle et al. (2007). In particular, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that benefits stemming from 
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diversification can be completely undermined by the volatility effect of new exposures introduced 
into a portfolio. Sanya et al. (2010) offers different kinds of mechanisms that can be detected to 
analyze the negative impact (or reduced benefits) of portfolio diversification on systemic risk. The 
first, discussed in Froot and Stein (1998) and Cebenyoyan and Strahan (2004), indicates that gains 
obtained from portfolio diversification will be limited if the banks (managing the portfolio) do not 
have a risk efficient portfolio. The second argues that diversification can play a negative role when 
banks expand their business into industries, with difficulties emerging from loan-monitoring 
activities. Wegner (2006) emphasizes the role of diversification as an incentive for taking greater 
and new risks in the international financial markets. De Vries (2010) states that “diversification 
lowers the risk of isolated shocks for a financial entity, but may simultaneously increase the 
systemic risk”. Recently, Allen et al. (2010) claim that the spread of credit default swaps and other 
credit derivative products, loan sales and collateralized loan obligations, has increased and 
improved the possibility for banks, mutual funds and financial institutions to diversify risk. But this 
possibility has, according to Allen et al. (2010) “also led to more overlap and more similarities 
among their portfolios. This has increased the probability that the failure of one institution is likely 
to coincide with the failure of other similar institutions” (p.6).  
Conversely, there is an opposing strand of the relevant economic literature which sustains the 
positive effects of diversification, first, from an efficiency gain point of view (Berger et al. (1999), 
Estrella (2002)), and second, in increasing bank stability (Grossman (1994), Wheelock (1995), 
Berger et al. (1999), Reichart and Wall (2000), Campa and Kedia (2002), and Baele et al. (2007)).  
 
3. The model  
Consider an economy formed by n agents. Each agent is endowed with a certain amount of 
wealth, whose rate of return varies stochastically from one agent to the other. The satisfaction of the 
i-th agent is measured by expected utility )( ii yEU , where E  is the expectation operator, (.)iU  
denotes a well behaved utility function and iy  is stochastic income. By projecting orthogonally the 
agent‟s stochastic individual income iy  onto the stochastic total  agents‟ income 
i
iyy , we can 
write the following identity: 
(1) iiii vyy )(  
where  0i
i
v   0iEv ,  ,0),( yvCov i   iiEy ;  
i
i
n
1
;  and ni
i
. 
 8 
Equation (1) decomposes individual risk into a systemic, diversifiable component, correlated 
with total  agents‟ revenue, and into an  independent, idiosyncratic component. 
 The variance of individual income, assuming no correlation between diversifiable and 
idiosyncratic risk is: 
 (1bis)   
222)( iyiiyVar  
By diversifying, each operator can bring her i  to unity, thus bringing her portfolio to 
coincide with the market portfolio, which by definition is the most diversified, being an average of 
all portfolios, thereby achieving a minimum variance (i.e. the variance of the most diversified 
portfolio).  
The distribution function (d.f.) of total revenue is )(yF  and its support is the compact 
interval ],0[ maxy , while the d.f. of the idiosyncratic component is )( ivG  over the support 
],[ maxmin ii vv . 
 Assume now that a derivative is introduced. In our context a derivative is defined  as a 
contingent claim whose value depends on one of the assets, i.e. income sources in the market, more 
specifically, we will assume it depends  on the average return of all other assets.  The derivative 
price )( yp  is assumed to be distributed with mean Ep , variance 
2
p  and covariance ip  with each 
agent‟s income.  The derivative corresponds to a contract between a issuer (i.e. a short holder)  and 
a buyer ( a long holder), whereby each party promises to pay the other a premium in different states 
of the world. 
The i-th agent is confronted with the problem of choosing an optimal number of units of the 
derivative to hold long (i.e. to purchase) or short (i.e. to issue), so that total income for each agent 
will be equal in each state of nature to the solution of the following maximization problem: 
(2)        )( ii
q
xxEUaM
i
 ,   pqyx iii  ;     ni ...2,1  
where iq  denotes the number of units of the security in terms of shares of the promised (random) 
payoff p , and is positive or negative according to whether the security is bought or sold by the ith 
agent. 
 Using (1) and the related assumptions, the expected utility in (2) can be written as follows: 
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 (3)     
max
min
max
0
)()())()(()(
i
i
v
v
y
iiiiiiii vdGydFypqvyUxEU  
     )())()((
max
0
ydFypqymV i
y
iii  
where 
iiim  and (.)iV  is the indirect utility function defined as: 
 (4)   
max
min
)()()(
i
i
v
v
iiiii vdGvmUmV  for all   i  
As shown by Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981), the indirect utility function in (4) is well 
behaved, i.e. it is increasing and concave in its arguments. 
In order to show that the introduction of the security increases the income of the i-th subject, 
it is sufficient to show that the problem in (2) has a solution with a non zero value for the security in 
question.  The first order condition is obtained differentiating (3) w.r.t. iq : 
 
(6)      0)()())(( '
0
'
max
pVEydFypV
dq
dEV
i
y
i
i
i , 
 
where primes indicate derivatives, while the second order condition requires: 
 
 (7)    0)(
2''
2
2
pVE
dq
EVd
i
i
i ,  
which is always satisfied for a concave utility function. Applying the definition of covariance to (6), 
we obtain: 
(8)   0))(( '' ypVCovEyEV ii  
 
Differentiating totally with respect to the parameters yields:  
 
(9)    0)]()([)]()([ ''''2''''' iiiiiii dpyVCovEppyVEdqpVCovEppVEdEpEV  
 which, by applying again the definition of covariance, can be also be written as: 
(10)   0)()( 2''2''' iiiii dypVEdqpVEdEpEV   
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 Since 0
)(
'
2''
i
i
i
EV
pVE
 and  0
)(
'
2''
i
i
i
EV
ypVE
 are both positive  measures of risk          
aversion, solving (10) for idq  yields: 
(11)   i
i
i
i
i d
dEp
dq  
Equation (11) establishes the fact that any increase in the expected pay off and/or in 
the beta will increase long positions while it will reduce short positions in the derivative asset. In a 
stable market equilibrium, we must have 
n
i
idq
1
0 , which implies: 
(12)   ddEp   
where 
m
i i
n
1
1)
1
(  and   
n
i
i
i
i
n
d
1
1
. 
Substituting (12) into (11) yields the equilibrium relationship: 
(13)    dddq
i
i
i
i
i   
     Expression (13) establishes the dependence of the quantities traded of the security on the 
difference between the individual incentive to diversify (through his beta and risk aversion) and the 
incentive to shift risk to or from more risk averse traders.  
 Expression (13) can be integrated, assuming that the utility function parameters are constant. 
A simpler way to proceed, however, is to expand 
'
iV  in (8) according to the Mac Laurin‟s formula: 
(14)   
2
0
'''
0
''
0
'
0
' ))((
2
1
))(( ypqymVypqymVVV iiiiiiiiii
  
where the subscripts 0  and  denote the fact that the derivatives of the utility function are 
measured, respectively, at the origin and at )( pqy ii , with 10 .    
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Substituting into (8), and assuming that all moments higher than two of the joint distribution 
of y  and p   are zero, yields: 
(15)    0)(
2
piypii qEp   
where 
'
''
0
i
i
i
EV
V
is a measure of absolute risk aversion and coincides with the Pratt coefficient for 
the family of constant risk aversion utility functions (CARA). 
Solving (15) for iq , we obtain: 
 (16)    
22
p
yp
i
pi
i
Ep
q        
Expression (16) shows that a solution to the maximization problem  is the result of two factors 
of agents‟ heterogeneity: (i) the degree of risk aversion and, (ii) the correlation between the security 
payoff and the agent income. However, in order for the  solutions for the different agents to be 
mutually compatible, the determination of the expected payoff Ep  should be competitively 
determined, i.e. 
i
iq 0 , so that : 
 (17)    ypEp  
where 
i i
n 1)
1
(  is the harmonic average of the individual risk aversion coefficients  and I 
have used the property : 
n
i
i n
1
. 
  
Substituting (17) into (16) yields: 
 (18)  )()(
i
ii
i
i
iq  
         where  
2
p
yp
 and 
)2()])([))(( 22 jpp
ji
ii
n
i
i ypqVar  
In conclusion, each agent will be able to improve her expected utility by diversifying into a 
short or long position on an additional contingent claim, depending on two effects: (i) the difference 
between average and individual demand for diversification (the beta) and, (ii) the difference 
 12 
between average and individual risk aversion. The equilibrium level of long and short positions will 
be independent from the expected level of the pay off, but will depend  only on its variance. For 
example, in the special case of a derivative that acts as an insurance (e.g. a put option) and pays to 
long holders yRp  when Ry  and cp  otherwise, we have that )(
22 RFyp  and 
)(2 RFyyp , so that  1  and :  
 (19)   )(
i
iiq   
 and 
)()()()20( ypvyx
i
ii
iiii  
so that : )2()()( 222222
j
jpp
i
ii
iyiixVar . 
Note that the introduction of the security has improved expected income of each agent, it has 
further diversified her portfolio, but, at the same time, has introduced a new source of variance 
(and, implicitly, risk), into the system. This new form of risk can be defined as “systemic”, because 
it depends on the correlation between the yield of the derivative and the income of all agents in the 
system. In other words, a shock on the price of the derivative is transmitted to all agents. 
 From equation (20), we can derive a modified version of the well known CAPM model, by 
subtracting from both sides the risk free rate of return r: 
)()()()()21( ypvryrx
i
ii
ifiiifi  
4. Dataset  
As noted in section 2, several methodologies have been implemented to measure systemic 
risk, based on different motivations and goals: we choose the correlation among mutual funds 
showing lower performances compared to the average level returns (threshold value) as a proxy of 
systemic risk (Syst_rsk). The choice of this approach is not novel in the literature (De Nicolo and 
Kwast (2002)), its advantage being that correlations among funds‟ returns are considered as a 
forward-looking variable much more suitable than balance sheets or company financial indicators to 
capture systemic failures and the associated costs. Furthermore, the correlation between returns of 
different funds reflect fund values. Following the approach by Chan et al. (2004), we  thus estimate 
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this variable through a pairwise correlation approach between the return of the i-th and the j-th 
fund:  
(23)           
Cov Ri,tR j,t
i j
2
i
2 2
,i
2
j
2 2
,i
2
 
As discussed above, we propose the systemic risk variable as the  pairwise correlation within 
the subset of  funds having lower than average performance:  
Rij,t x ij,t x ij
_
if x it,t x ij
_
 
Rij,t 0 otherwise 
We analyze a panel of the 226 largest mutual funds (based on size) from the Morningstar 
database
4
. The U.S. market is analyzed through 162 funds and through 64 funds for the European 
area, exchanged in the market between January 2003 and March 2010, thereby amounting to 19.662 
monthly observations. We chose as the risk-free rate for the U.S market  the 3-Months Treasury 
Bills from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis (FED of Saint Louis) database. For the 
European market, we use the 3-Months German government bond from the Bloomberg database. 
Through a Return Based Style Analysis (RBSA), we create a return weighted index able to capture 
the equity stocks, government bonds and corporate fund performances. Bond, equity and cash 
compose the n-segments of any fund in the n-th portfolio.  
 In order to build up these two proxies (for both the U.S and European market) we consider: 
 the U.S and European Morgan Stanley (MSCI) index for government bonds;  
 the U.S and European J.P Morgan (JPM EMBI) index for the stock exchange;  
 the U.S and European Merry Lynch (ML-Corporate) index for the corporate sector.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The largest funds are chosen by size. Having our database comprised of 226 mutual funds exchanged in n different 
countries, we divide these mutual funds into three wide macro-areas of affiliation. Europe = Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. North America = United States, Canada and Mexico. 
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Figure 1: US market performances 
 
Source: Authors‟ elaborations on Bloomberg database. The “weighted” index is the market index created on the 
other three index performances.  
Figure 2: EU market performances 
 
Source: Authors‟ elaborations on Bloomberg database. The “weighted” index is the market index created on the 
other three index performances.  
The Libor-OIS (Overnight Interest Swap) (Libor_Ois) for the American market, and the 
spread Euribor-Ois (Euribor_Ois) for the European market are considered as proxies for banks‟ 
soundness and as a reliable indicator of the stability of the banking system
5
.  The diversification 
                                                          
5
 The importance of this spread is asserted both by Alan Greenspan “Libor-OIS remains a barometer of fears of bank 
insolvency” and the Vice President of the FED of St. Louis, D.L. Thornton “the term Libor-OIS spread is assumed to be 
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index (DIV) has been measured as the difference from each portfolio , in terms of asset allocation, 
and an equally diversified portfolio. The variable Beta Market (ßmkt) is the difference between the 
return weighted index  previously mentioned and the risk free rate (see above); while the Excess 
Return (Exc_Ret) is the difference between the mutual fund returns and the risk free rate (see 
above) , for both the U.S and European markets. The Consumer price index growth rate (Cpi) for 
the U.S and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
6
 for Europe represent the two 
variables accounting for inflation. The 2007, 2008 and 2009 (D07, D08, D09) dummy variables 
take into account the years where the last crisis created increased turbulence in the financial 
markets. A detailed list of the variables used in the empirical analysis is presented in Table 1. 
5. The Estimation Strategy and the Empirical Results 
We estimate a simultaneous equation model, based on the classical CAPM formulation 
augmented by a variable that represents the contribution that diversification through derivatives 
makes to systemic risk. In Tables 2 and 3, we show the result of the CAPM estimates in the two 
markets (U.S and Europe). In particular, using  the CAPM specification presented in Fama et al. 
(2004), we regress  individual (fund) excess returns on  market returns,  the diversification index 
and a series of dummy variables. In both markets, we find a positive relation between Beta and 
excess returns. Although the two markets show a significant difference in their Beta coefficients, 
(approximately 1.16 in the U.S and around 0.86 in the European market) no  sizeable variation 
appears in intra-market differences (the U.S market beta ranges between 1.14 and 1.17 while the 
European market beta varies between 0.84 and almost 0.89). In the U.S and European market, the 
diversification variable shows a positive and a high significant coefficient, while the systemic risk 
variable negatively impacts the excess returns (dependent variable).  
Once we examined the CAPM analysis, in order to assess the impact of the diversification 
strategy on systemic risk, we specify a model in which the market excess returns and the indicators 
of systemic risk are simultaneously determined and depend on a series of key variables that, 
according to the literature, play a fundamental role both in influencing the beta market and as a 
possible factor impacting systemic risk. The model is estimated by using two stage least squares. 
The first equation  is given by: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
a measure of the health of banks because it reflects what banks believe is the risk of default associated with lending to 
other banks”. 
6
 Consumer price inflation in the Euro area is measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The 
HICP is compiled by Eurostat and the national statistical institutes in accordance with harmonised statistical methods 
(http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/hicp/html/index.en.html). 
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(22a)  - U.S. Market: 
Mkt_Betai,t Sist_ rski,t Fcorri,t Cpii,t Libor_Oisi,t D08i D09i ut  
(22b) - European Market: 
Mkt_Betai,t Sist_ rski,t Fcorri,t HICPi,t Euribor_Oisi,t D08i D09i ut  
 Equations (22a-b) test the hypothesis that systemic risk variable has a negative impact on 
the market performances. In addition to the dependent variable Mkt_Beta, measured as the market 
monthly excess return, the independent variables are:  the systemic index measured as the fund 
correlations (without any return threshold); the consumer price index growth rate (for the American 
market) and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (for the European market); the spread 
Libor-Ois (Libor_Ois) for the American market; the spread Euribor-Ois (Euribor_Ois) for the 
European market as proxies of bank sector soundness; and the 2007, 2008 and 2009 dummy 
variables on the Market Beta variable (Mkt_Beta), (defined as difference between market 
performance, created through the RBSA, and the risk free rate).  
 As tables 4-5 show, an increase in the correlation of mutual funds‟ returns (Fcorr) has a  
negative and significant impact on market excess returns (Mkt_Beta). This  effect is strongly 
significant in both the U.S and EU markets. These findings clearly emerge from the tests applied 
through the first hypothesis in any specification of the 22a-b models. The Libor (Euribor)-OIS 
spread represents the unsecured interest rate at which banks lend money to other banks which must 
satisfy certain criteria for creditworthiness. Libor and Euribor are not entirely credit risk-free, 
because they reflect both liquidity risk and the bank‟s default risk over the following months. The 
OIS represents the average of the overnight interest rates expected until maturity, so the Libor 
(Euribor) – OIS reflects both the liquidity and default risks over the next months. Then, during the 
period where the stock markets register a strong performance, this spread should be subjected to a 
reduction. In this context, our results confirm the negative relationship between market performance 
and the Libor (Euribor) – OIS spread indicator. The Cpi and Hicp negative coefficients support the 
strand of the literature that predicts a negative relationship between inflation and stock 
performances in the short run.  
In the second equation of the simultaneous model, (23a-b) we aim to test the second 
hypothesis, i.e. that an increase in the similarities of the diversification strategies of each fund can 
increase the threat of systemic risk. In this case the dependent variable is the systemic risk, while the 
independent variables are the three dummy variables for 2007-2008-2009, the fundsize and the 
Cpi/Hicp growth rate on the systemic risk variable.  
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(23a) - U.S. Market:   
Sist_ rski,t Mkt_Betai,t Fcorri,t Cpii,t Libor_Oisi,t Divi,t Fsizei,t D07i D08i D09i ut
 
(23b) - European Market: 
Sist_ rski,t Mkt_Betai,t Fcorri,t HICPi,t Euribor_Oisi,t Divi,t Fsizei,t D07i D08i D09i ut
 
The results of the empirical analysis are contained in table 4 for the U.S market, and table 5 
for the European market. In general all these variables show a high level of significance, although 
the diversification index variable is weakly significant at 10%. The strategy in the asset allocation 
investment choices is captured by the diversification index (Div) variable. This index explains how 
portfolio diversification can increase the threat of systemic risk as dependent variable. The 
similarities in fund returns for each portfolio are instead represented by the Fcorr  that also shows a 
positive  and significant coefficient. This suggests that an increase of the  correlation among fund 
returns  can be interpreted as a warning for a distress situation in the financial system. As already 
explained in the first stage, in periods when the stock markets register good performances, this 
measure is subjected to a reduction, conversely in periods of turmoil this spread should increase so 
as to capture the market risks. In the estimate of the second equation, we thus find that an incrase of 
this spread leads to an increase of the threat of systemic risk. Further in both specifications (model 
23a-b) we find a positive relation between the dummy variables, the Fund size and the CPI (for the 
American market) or the Hicp (for the European market) and the systemic risk variable. The Market 
Beta variable has a negative effect on systemic risk, suggesting that deteriorating market 
performance reverberates negatively on systemic risk. 
6. Concluding Remarks  
  The theoretical and empirical motivation of this analysis is the ongoing debate which 
posits that derivative driven financial diversification, often interpreted by professionals and 
academics as a fundamental benefit of investment financial strategies, can be undesirable and a 
driver of excessive instability. Our results provide insight into the connection between portfolio 
diversification strategies and the impact on systemic risk. In this regard, we have developed a model 
where the i-th agent diversification strategy interacts with the j-th agent diversification strategy, 
through the mutual purchase and sale of derivatives, thus increasing agents‟ interdependence, the 
probability of contagion from a systemic event and, ultimately, systemic risk. The basic reason for 
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this result is that derivatives provide an insidious instrument of diversification. While they appeal to 
risk managers because of their capacity, as contingent claims, to provide insurance to individual 
investors, at the same time, they create a separate source of portfolio volatility which may be 
increasingly difficult to further diversify.  
Some of the implications of the theoretical model have been tested through a simultaneous 
equations model, where we have hypothesized that systemic risk may increase the need to further 
diversify and, at the same time, further diversification, by increasing portfolio similarities, can boost 
systemic risk. Both hypothesis appear to be corroborated by our econometric tests, which show 
significant and mutual substantial impacts of the signs implied by the model, between 
diversification and systemic risk variables. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows: from the point of view of the individual agent, 
the portfolio diversification strategy represents a valuable instrument of portfolio management. 
However, from the point of view of the financial system, when such a diversification is pursued 
through a proliferation of derivative securities, the increase in similarities and mutual 
interdependence among financial agents may result in an increase in aggregate risk. Such an 
increase has systemic nature since it is based on the loss of a diversified ensemble of financial 
agents as a key source of systemic resilience.  
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List of tables 
Table 1a: Complete list of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Sample Frequency Source Acronym 
Market Beta 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
Authors elaborations 
on Morningstar and 
Bloomberg data 
Mkt_Beta 
Excess Return 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
Authors elaborations 
on Morningstar and 
Bloomberg data 
Exc_ret 
Fund correlation 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
Author elaborations 
on Morningstar data 
Fcorr 
Systemic risk 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
Author elaborations 
on Morningstar data 
Syst_risk 
Spread Euribor OIS 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly Bloomberg Euribor_Ois 
Spread Libor OIS 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
FED St. Louis 
database 
Libor_Ois 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Cpi 
Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly ECB statistics HICP 
Fund Size 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly Morningstar Fsize 
Dummy 2007 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly Dummy variable D07 
Dummy 2008 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly Dummy variable D08 
Dummy 2009 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly Dummy variable D09 
Diversification Index 
Jan ‟03- 
Mar „10 
monthly 
Author elaborations 
on Morningstar data 
Div 
Source: Author‟s elaborations 
Table 1b: Summary statistics of variables 
 min p1 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 max mean sd N 
Mkt_Beta_US -0.66         -0.66 -0.18 -0.08 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.49 0.93 0.02 0.19 16502 
Mkt_Beta_EU -0.65 -0.65 -0.22 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.75 0.89 0.05 0.18 3160 
Fcorr_US -0.76 -0.58 -0.32 -0.30 0.14 0.19 0.38 0.55 0.93 0.03 0.71 14456 
Fcorr_EU -0.82 -0.74 -0.41 -0.19 0.09 0.23 0.34 0.59 0.87 0.01 0.41 3160 
Sist_rsk_US -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.32 0.49 0.67 0.04 185.89 11225 
Sist_rst_EU -0.03 -0.04 -4.39 0.00 0.21 0.32 0.39 0.44 0.75 0.03 185.89 2770 
Exc_ret_US -0.65 -0.65 -0.15 -0.06 0.04 0.16 0.25 0.49 0.49 0.04 0.19 16502 
Exc_ret_EU -0.64 -0.64 -0.20 -0.03 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.75 0.75 0.05 0.18 3160 
Rend_WI_US -1.25 -0.39 -0.13 -0.03 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.48 0.61 0.25 0.09 16502 
Rend_WI_EU -1.31 -0.63 -0.28 -0.17 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.58 0.13 0.13 3160 
Cpi -2.00 -2.00 -0.10 2.00 2.90 3.01 3.90 5.17 6.01 3.01 1.87 16502 
Hicp -1.76 -1.88 -0.10 1.50 2.80 3.60 4.20 5.50 5.50 2.55 1.56 3160 
DIV_US 1.49 11.86 26.90 33.26 38.57 44.72 53.20 68.60 214.61 39.26 11.06 10171 
DIV_EU 1.07 8.85 24.63 30.87 39.55 50.31 60.06 117.67 808.19 42.30 24.59 2770 
libor_OIS 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.38 0.87 2.39 2.39 0.33 0.45 16502 
euribor_OIS 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.45 0.79 1.86 1.86 0.29 0.37 3160 
Fsize_US 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.57 1.17 2.49 10.62 37.31 2.34 2.05 16502 
Fsize_EU 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.29 0.63 1.56 2.86 13.54 29.32 1.96 1.73 3160 
Source: Author‟s elaborations 
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Table 1c: Variables, unit of measurement and explanation 
Mkt_Beta Percentage 
Difference between market index  
weighted performances and the risk free rate 
Exc_ret Percentage Difference between fund returns and the risk free rate 
Fcorr Percentage Correlation between funds‟ returns 
Sist_risk Percentage 
Correlation between funds‟ returns  
performing below the average value 
Return_WI Percentage 
Market Weighted Index performance  
based on the Return Based Style Analysis 
Cpi 
Percentage 
Consumer Price Index (US market) 
Hicp 
Percentage 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (EU market) 
DIV Percentage 
Diversification index obtained by the sum of the square 
differences between portfolio composition (in terms of 
asset allocation) and a portfolio equally diversified 
libor_OIS Percentage Libor-OIS monthly spread 
euribor_OIS              Percentage Euribor-OIS monthly spread 
Fsize Billion of dollars Fund Size 
Source: Author‟s elaborations 
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Table 2: CAPM model (U.S. market)  
Mkt_Beta_US 1.174*** 1.177*** 1.178*** 1.150*** 1.147*** 
 (148.00) (141.25) (140.85) (128.89) (126.16) 
Syst_Risk -0.395*** -0.366*** -0.361*** -0.260*** -0.264*** 
 (5.01) (4.51) (4.44) (3.17) (3.22) 
DIV_US  0.046*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
  (3.22) (3.09) (3.31) (3.31) 
Dummy 2007   0.009**   
   (2.01)   
Dummy 2008    -0.039*** -0.038*** 
    (8.10) (7.92) 
Dummy 2009     0.008 
     (1.61) 
Constant 0.016*** -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (10.73) (0.44) (0.55) (0.50) (0.32) 
Observations 11225 10171 10171 10171 10171 
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1% 
Source: Author‟s elaborations 
 
 
Table 3: CAPM model (EU market)  
Mkt_Beta_EU 0.882*** 0.876*** 0.875*** 0.861*** 0.841*** 
 (49.98) (47.13) (46.93) (41.56) (40.17) 
Syst_Risk -0.352* -0.383* -0.388** -0.333* -0.354* 
 (1.83) (1.95) (1.97) (1.68) (1.79) 
DIV_EU  0.026*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 
  (2.12) (2.11) (2.23) (1.95) 
Dummy 2007   -0.006   
   (0.67)   
Dummy 2008    -0.018* -0.010 
    (1.69) (0.89) 
Dummy 2009     0.051*** 
     (5.29) 
Constant -0.002 -0.015** -0.014** -0.012* -0.023*** 
 (0.56) (2.32) (2.05) (1.84) (3.24) 
Observations 3160 2770 2770 2770 2770 
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1% 
Source: Author‟s elaborations 
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Table 4: Simultaneous equations model (U.S. market)  
First equation: Dependent variable = Market Beta  
Systemic Risk -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (8.46) (7.67) (10.35) (14.49) 
Fcorr_US -0.069*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.076*** 
 (7.91) (2.77) (10.93) (20.31) 
Dummy 2008 0.187*** 0.276*** 0.052*** 0.027** 
 (4.90) (10.10) (5.81) (2.53) 
Cpi growth rate -0.031***    
 (7.22)    
Spread Libor-OIS  -0.072** -0.156***  
  (2.31) (22.43)  
Dummy 2009  0.174*** 0.169*** 0.150*** 
  (8.54) (27.60) (19.14) 
Constant 0.136*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.034*** 
 (11.11) (4.83) (20.53) (11.23) 
Second Equation: Dep. Var. = Systemic Risk 
Fcorr_US 16.419***   37.284** 
 (4.94)   (2.49) 
DIV_US 0.029* 0. 030* 0.065* 0.029* 
 (1.27) (1.18) (0.73) (1.56) 
Market Beta -1.286*** -1.431*** -1.882*** -1.688*** 
 (4.86) (5.26) (7.23) (3.70) 
Dummy 2008 49.519*** 71.096*** 38.621*** 79.826*** 
 (6.36) (7.37) (5.97) (2.62) 
Spread Libor-OIS 36.970***   38.436*** 
 (4.95)   (4.56) 
Dummy 2007  5.180***   
  (3.43)   
Dummy 2009  45.340*** 117.786***  
  (5.65) (16.25)  
Cpi growth rate  5.951*** 28.373*** 94.066*** 
  (2.86) (15.82) (4.06) 
Found Size   7.938*** 12.238*** 
   (9.39) (9.68) 
Constant -2.464 -15.204** -88.685*** -
402.187***  (0.75) (2.43) (11.46) (4.13) 
Observations 10168 10168 10168 10168 
R-Square 0.141 0.153 0.156 0.147 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1% 
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Table 5: Simultaneous equations model (European market)  
First equation: Dependent variable = Market Beta 
Systemic Risk -1.481* -1.754* -0.909*** -2.909* 
 (1.64) (1.44) (2.71) (1.19) 
Fcorr_EU -0.117* -0.133* -0.311*** -0.04*** 
 (1.65) (11.61) (2.78) (1.18) 
Dummy 2008 0.205*** 0.074*** 0.087*** 0.196*** 
 (12.95) (12.11) (4.05) (4.92) 
HICP growth rate -0.024***  -0.025***  
 (7.55)  (7.30)  
Constant 0.189*** 0.051*** 0.108*** 0.047*** 
 (3.99) (0.78) (14.73) (6.13) 
Second equation: Dependent variable = Systemic risk 
 
 
II stage Y = Systemic risk 
Fcorr_EU 0.079*** 0.076*** 2.311*** 0.246 
 (12.06) (1.40) (2.78) (9.83) 
DIV_EU 0.003* 0.015* 0.008* 0.002* 
 (1.26) (0.35) (0.37) (0.12) 
Beta_EU -0.241*** -0.241***  -0.231*** 
 (5.47) (3.75)  (3.77) 
Dummy 2007 0.007* 0.012*   
 (0.96) (1.42)   
Dummy 2008 0.106*** 0.209*** -0.217*** 0.057*** 
 (9.65) (6.03) (4.77) (5.31) 
EU spread 0.062*** 0.038*** 0.063*** 0.018* 
 (6.42) (3.25) (3.24) (1.40) 
Dummy 2009  0.058***  0.044 
  (3.75)  (1.20) 
Exc return EU   -0.137***  
   (32.11)  
Found Size    -0.000 
    (0.04) 
Constant -0.052*** -0.051 -0.373*** -0.115 
 (9.45) (7.06) (4.17) (0.89) 
Observations 4484 4484 4484 4484 
R-Square 0.112 0.116 0.123 0.119 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1% 
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